Mike Peters' Website

Michael Peters
Department of Economics
University of British Columbia
997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Z1
Phone: 604-822-4418
peters at econ dot ubc dot ca

Mingli Zheng has created an applet that lets you follow the bidding that occurred on auctions for Pentium processors during June and July of 2001 on eBay. The applet shows many auctions at once, so you can observe not only what people bid, but also where they bid. This is the focus of the working paper Internet Auctions with Many Traders linked below. You can read a description of the applet, or use the php version of the applet

Research

Can Econjobmarket help Canadian Departments
Unobserved Mechanisms with Li Hao.
Understanding Transitions Using DIrected Search with Kun Li and Pai Xu
Can Mechanism Designers Exploit Buyers Market Information May 2015
Survey on Competing Mechnisms 2 - The revelation principle Canadian Journal of Economics 47(2), May 2014, pages 373-397.
Matching by Luck or Search: Evidence from the Executive Labor Market with Pai Xu and Kun Li Jan 2014)
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design with Gorkem Celik to appear in the Canadian Journal of Economics, 2015
A Brief Survey of ideas in the Competing Mechanisms literature written for the Handbook of Market Design. Last Revised: 2010-08-24 14:18:45 -0700 (Tue, 24 Aug 2010)(Revision: 2)
Reciprocal Contracting Last Revised: 2015-03-09 15:20:07 -0700 (Mon, 09 Mar 2015)(Revision: 201) to appear in the Journal of Economic Theory
A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms - with Christian Troncoso Valverde, Journal of Economic Theory 148(3) pp 953-973, 2013
Definable and Contractible Contracts - with Balazs Szentes, Econometrica 80(1) pp 363--411, 2012
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism - with Gorkem Celik, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf)
Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium :A Bayesian Approach Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/foundations_hedonic_2/foundations_hedonic_2.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/foundations_hedonic_2/foundations_hedonic_2.pdf)
Other Regarding Preference: Outcomes, Intentions or Interdependence, with Yoram Halevy
, previously titled The Ultimatum Game; Interdependent Prefrences in an Experimental Setting
Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium Last Revised: 2009-03-03 15:24:34 -0800 (Tue, 03 Mar 2009)(Revision: 83)
Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search Last Revised /web/htdocs/michael_peters/mixed_equilibrium/working_paper apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/michael_peters/mixed_equilibrium/working_paper)
Non-Cooperative Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium July 2004
The Pre-Marital Investment Game February 2004, Revised December 2005
- Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum an existence proof for the general version of the game.
Internet Trading Mechanisms and Rational Expectations June 2003 - revised Jan 06 - with Sergei Severinov. The new title of the paper is An Ascending Double Auction.
Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents to appear in Economic Theory.
Internet Auctions with Many Traders with Sergei Severinov. to appear in the Journal of Economic Theory.
Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency Journal of Economic Theory July 2003, Volume 111, Issue 1, Pages 88-109.
- A correction for one of the conditions used to prove the main theorem.
Competing Pre-Marital Investments with Aloysius Siow, revised March 2001. This is the extended working paper version of the paper that appeared in the Journal of Political Economy
Common Agency and The Revelation Principle in postscript or acrobat. Published in Econometrica 69 (5) pp 1349--1372 September 2001. Also a correction for an example that appeared in the paper.

Research

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