Intro

- let X be a set of alternatives, X × X is the Cartesian product of X with itself. A binary relation on X is a subset P ⊂ X × X
- orderings of alternatives can be thought of as binary relations
 e.g. if x and y both elements of X and (x, y) ∈ P then one might say that x is at least as good as y, or x ≽ y

Examples

- 1. a set of alternative consumption bundles
- a set of alternative policies with x ≽ y meaning that x is 'socially preferred' to y
- a set of alternative policies with x ≽ y meaning that x would defeat y in a referendum between the two
- a set probability distributions with x ≥ y meaning that the distribution x first order stochastically dominates y
- a set of strategy rules in a game with x ≽ y meaning the rule x weakly dominates the rule y
- a set of numbers with x ≽ y meaning that x is bigger than y
 (an example where a binary relation is an ordering)

some binary relations have strange properties - for example

	ТС	BΒ	IS
С	1	2	3
F	2	3	1
Μ	3	1	2

rows are parties, numbers represent their preferences over policies TC,BB and IS. Every policy is defeated in a majority vote against some alternative (Condorcet paradox).

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆三▶ ◆三▶ 三三 のへで

- a preference relation is a special binary relation intended to represent an individual choice process - one imagines that it has two properties
 - 1. Completeness for any pair $(x, y) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{X}$ either $x \succeq y$ or $y \succeq x$ or both.

2. Transitivity for any $x, y, z \in \mathcal{X} \ x \succeq y$ and $y \succeq z \Rightarrow x \succeq z$

a preference satisfying these two properties is sometimes called a *rational preference relation* Utility Functions

a function u : X → ℝ is called a *utility function* representing preference relation ≽ if for all x, y ∈ X

$$x \succeq y \iff u(x) \ge u(y)$$

intransitive preference relations typically can't be represented by utility functions - if a binary relation ≽ is intransitive, then there are three options x, y, and z such that x ≽ y; y ≿ z but not x ≿ z. Now suppose there is a utility function representing this relation. Then x ≿ y ⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y) while y ≿ z ⇒ u(y) ≥ u(z) so that u(x) ≥ u(z) which by definition means that x ≿ z. Since we know this is false, the assertion that there is a utility function must also be false. This is an example of a proof by contradiction.

- a critical question is whether there is some way to infer the existence of a preference relation from something that you can observe.
- Let B be a family of subsets of X and P(X) the collection of all subsets of X (the power set of X) a correspondence
 C : B → P(X) is called a *choice correspondence* if C(B) ≠ Ø and C(B) ⊂ B for all B ∈ B
- ▶ the set *B* corresponds to the set of experiments or outcomes.
- ► the choice correspondence C satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference if for any pair of sets B and B' and points x ∈ B ∩ B' and y ∈ B ∩ B', x ∈ C (B) and y ∈ C (B') ⇒ x ∈ C (B').

example:

$$\mathcal{X} = \{x, y, z\}, \\ \mathcal{B} = \{\{x\}, \{y\}, \{z\}, \{x, y\}, \{x, z\}, \{y, z\}, \{x, y, z\}\} \\ \mathbf{and}$$

•
$$C(\{x, y\}) = \{x\}; C(\{x, y, z\}) = \{x, y\}$$

▶ fails the weak axiom because y is chosen given choice set {x, y, z} and x is also in {x, y, z}. x is chosen in {x, y} but y isn't

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆臣▶ ◆臣▶ 臣 のへで

 every rational preference relation supports a choice correspondence in the obvious way

$$C_{\succeq}(B) = \{x \in B : x \succeq y \forall y \in B\}$$

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆三▶ ◆三▶ ○○ のへで

provided that this set is always non-empty

Theorem: every choice correspondence supported by a rational preference relation satisfies the weak axiom Proof: Suppose not. Then there are sets B, B' and points $x \in B \cap B'$ and $y \in B \cap B'$ such that

- ► (i) $x \in C_{\succeq}(B)$; (ii) $y \in C_{\succeq}(B')$ and (iii) $x \notin C_{\succeq}(B')$.
- ▶ Since C_{\succeq} is supported by a preference relation $x \succeq y$ by (i).
- By (iii) there is a point z in B' such that z ≽ x but not x ≿ z (z ≻ x).

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆三▶ ◆三▶ 三三 のへで

By (ii) y ≥ z > x. Then x ≥ y ≥ z but not x ≥ z, so the preference relation isn't transitive.

- we want the other way around if we run a series of experiments and find that some agents' choices obey the weak axiom, can we conclude that the trader will behave as if he has a rational preference ordering? can we discover this preference ordering?
- Not generally Example \mathcal{X} as above with

•
$$\mathcal{B} = \{\{x, y\}, \{y, z\}, \{x, z\}\}$$
 and

• (i)
$$C(\{x,y\}) = x$$
, (ii) $C(\{y,z\}) = y$ and (iii) $C(x,z) = z$.

Note that this set of choices implies intransivity because if the rationalizing preference relation exists, then x ≻ y by (i), y ≻ z by (ii) and z ≻ x by (iii). The weak axiom holds because the sets in B simply don't give the decision maker an opportunity to violate the weak axiom.

- ► Theorem: let C be a choice correspondence satisfying the weak axiom. Suppose that for any three distinct points x, y, and z in X there exist sets B and B' in B such that B = {x, y} and B' = {x, y, z}. Then there is a rational preference relation supporting C.
 - Proof: Define the binary relation \succeq_C as follows
 - $x \succeq_C y$ iff $\exists B : x \in B$; $y \in B$ and $x \in C(B)$.
 - ► Since C is defined on all sets in B and B contains all two element sets, then for any pair of points {x, y} either

- $x \in C(\{x, y\})$ or $y \in C(\{x, y\})$ or both.
- This is equivalent to $x \succeq_C y$ or $y \succeq_C x$ or both.

- Suppose now that $x \succeq_C y$ and $y \succeq_C z$.
- ► C ({x, y, z}) must contain at least one point.
- If that point is x then x ≽_C z by definition, and the relation is transitive.
- If the point is y then since x ≽_C y there is some set B" such that y ∈ B", and x ∈ C (B"), so by the weak axiom x ∈ C ({x, y, z}) which gives x ≿_C z.

- ▶ If the point is z, use the same reasoning to show that $y \in C(\{x, y, z\})$, from which the same logic gives $x \in C(x, y, z)$ or $x \succeq_C z$.
- This proves that \succeq_C is transitive.

- So ∠_C is a rational preference relation (note how the assumptions were used in this argument what would go wrong if B did not contain all sets of the form {x, y, z}?).
- if the set of alternatives X were finite, which would be easier to check, a preference relation ≥ is complete and transitive, or a choice correspondence C satisfies the weak axiom?
- $\blacktriangleright \succeq_C$ supports a choice correspondence. Is it the same as C?
- If X is finite, B consists of all subsets of X and C satisfies the weak axiom, can you construct a utility function that represents the preference relation ≥_C?

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆臣▶ ◆臣▶ 臣 のへで

- $\mathcal{X} \subset \mathbb{R}_n$ and \succeq is a binary relation on $\mathbb{R}_n \times \mathbb{R}_n$.
- ▶ \succeq is continuous if whenever $\{x_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ and $\{y_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ are (convering) sequences of consumption bundles satisfying $x_n \succeq y_n$ for all *n*, then $\lim_{n\to\infty} x_n \succeq \lim_{n\to\infty} y_n$
- Theorem: let ≥ be a continuous rational preference ordering satisfying the property that x ≥ x' implies x ≥ x' and x ≠ x' and x ≥ x' together imply x > x' (monotonicity). Then there exists a utility function u that represents ≥.

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆目▶ ◆目▶ 目 のへで

▶ Proof: Let $e \in \mathbb{R}^N_+$ be such that e = [1, 1, ... 1]. Let

$$Z = \left\{ x' \in \mathbb{R}^{N}_{+} : x = lpha e ext{ for some } lpha \geq 0
ight\}$$

- For any x ∈ ℝ^N₊₊ there is a z ∈ Z such that z ≥ x (one such would be z ≡ [max_j x_j] · e), and so by monotonicity, z ≽ x.
- Similarly, there is a z' ∈ Z (i.e. 0) such that x ≥ z', and therefore x ≽ z'.
- ▶ So the sets $P^+(x) = \{z \in Z : z \succeq x\}$ and $P^-(x) = \{z' \in Z : x \succeq z'\}$ are both non-empty.
- By completeness of preferences, z ≥ x or x ≥ z for all z ∈ Z, so Z = P⁺(x) ∪ P⁻(x).

- ▶ P⁺(x) and P⁻(x) must have a point in common (if they don't then P⁻(x) is the complement of P⁺(x) in Z which means at least one of them must be an open set violating continuity).
- Furthermore they can have only one point in common by monotonicity. Let α (x) e be this point. The claim is that α (x) is the desired utility function.
- To see it, suppose that α (x) ≥ α (y). Then by monotonicity α (x) e ≽ α (y) (e). By transitivity, x ~ α (x) e ≽ α (y) e ~ y implies x ≽ y. The reverse implication is proved in a similar way.

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆臣▶ ◆臣▶ 臣 のへで