- Can Mechanism Designers Exploit Buyers Market Information Last Revised: 2015-04-24 08:28:24 -0700 (Fri, 24 Apr 2015)(Revision: 105)
- Survey on Competing Mechnisms 2 - The revelation principle Last Revised: 2013-09-12 15:20:55 -0700 (Thu, 12 Sep 2013)(Revision: 26)
- Matching by Luck or Search: Evidence from the Executive Labor Market with Pai Xu and Kun Li Last Revised: 2014-01-14 11:00:23 -0800 (Tue, 14 Jan 2014)(Revision: 71)
- Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design with Gorkem Celik Last Revised: 2013-10-29 06:43:05 -0700 (Tue, 29 Oct 2013)(Revision: 214)
- A Brief Survey of ideas in the Competing Mechanisms literature written for the Handbook of Market Design. Last Revised: 2010-08-24 14:18:45 -0700 (Tue, 24 Aug 2010)(Revision: 2)
- Reciprocal Contracting Last Revised: 2015-03-09 15:20:07 -0700 (Mon, 09 Mar 2015)(Revision: 201)
- A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms - with Christian Troncoso Valverde, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/multiple_agency/multiple_agency.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/multiple_agency/multiple_agency.pdf)
- Definable and Contractible Contracts - with Balazs Szentes, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/folk_theorem/folk_theorem.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/folk_theorem/folk_theorem.pdf)
- Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism - with Gorkem Celik, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf)
- Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium :A Bayesian Approach Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/foundations_hedonic_2/foundations_hedonic_2.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/foundations_hedonic_2/foundations_hedonic_2.pdf)
- Other Regarding Preference: Outcomes, Intentions or Interdependence, with Yoram Halevy
, previously titled The Ultimatum Game; Interdependent Prefrences in an Experimental Setting
- Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium Last Revised: 2009-03-03 15:24:34 -0800 (Tue, 03 Mar 2009)(Revision: 83)
- Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search Last Revised /web/htdocs/michael_peters/mixed_equilibrium/working_paper apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/michael_peters/mixed_equilibrium/working_paper)
- Non-Cooperative Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium July 2004
- The Pre-Marital Investment Game February 2004, Revised December 2005
- Internet Trading Mechanisms and Rational Expectations June 2003 - revised Jan 06 - with Sergei Severinov. The new title of the paper is An Ascending Double Auction.
- Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents to appear in Economic Theory.
- Internet Auctions with Many Traders
with Sergei Severinov. to appear in the Journal of Economic Theory.
Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency
Journal of Economic Theory July 2003, Volume 111, Issue 1, Pages 88-109.
- A correction for one of the conditions used to prove the
Competing Pre-Marital Investments with
Aloysius Siow, revised March 2001. This is the extended working paper version of the paper that appeared in the Journal of Political Economy
Common Agency and The Revelation Principle in postscript
or acrobat. Published in Econometrica 69 (5) pp 1349--1372 September 2001. Also a correction for an example that appeared in the paper.
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers and Costly
Search - April 98 Journal of Economic Theory at IDEAL 95(2) December 2000, or local version
Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment Review of Economic Design 4 (1999)2 pp 273-292
Surplus Extraction and Competition
Review of Economic Studies, July 2001, vol 68, issue 3
A revelation Principle for Competing
Mechanisms (with Larry Epstein) Journal of Economic Theory 88(1) September 1999 pp 119-161