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Michael Peters Department of Economics
University of British Columbia
997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Z1
Phone: 604-822-4418
peters at econ dot ubc dot ca
Fax: 604-822-5915
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Research
- Matching by Luck or Search: Evidence from the Executive Labor Market with Pai Xu and Kun Li
- Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design with Gorkem Celik Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/reciprocal_mechanisms/reciprocal_mechanisms.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/reciprocal_mechanisms/reciprocal_mechanisms.pdf)
- A Brief Survey of ideas in the Competing Mechanisms literature written for the Handbook of Market Design. Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/competing/competing.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/competing/competing.pdf)
- A Revlelation Principle for Competing MechanismsLast Revised /web/htdocs/mike/dual_mechanisms/dual_mechanisms.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/dual_mechanisms/dual_mechanisms.pdf) The new tile of the paper is Reciprocal Contracting
- A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms - with Christian Troncoso Valverde, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/multiple_agency/multiple_agency.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/multiple_agency/multiple_agency.pdf)
- Definable and Contractible Contracts - with Balazs Szentes, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/folk_theorem/folk_theorem.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/folk_theorem/folk_theorem.pdf)
- Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism - with Gorkem Celik, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf)
- Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium :A Bayesian Approach Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/foundations_hedonic_2/foundations_hedonic_2.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/foundations_hedonic_2/foundations_hedonic_2.pdf)
- Other Regarding Preference: Outcomes, Intentions or Interdependence, with Yoram Halevy
, previously titled The Ultimatum Game; Interdependent Prefrences in an Experimental Setting
- Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/truncated_hedonic/truncated_hedonic.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/truncated_hedonic/truncated_hedonic.pdf)
- Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search Last Revised /web/htdocs/michael_peters/mixed_equilibrium/working_paper apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/michael_peters/mixed_equilibrium/working_paper)
- Non-Cooperative Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium July 2004
- The Pre-Marital Investment Game February 2004, Revised December 2005
- Internet Trading Mechanisms and Rational Expectations June 2003 - revised Jan 06 - with Sergei Severinov. The new title of the paper is An Ascending Double Auction.
- Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents to appear in Economic Theory.
- Internet Auctions with Many Traders
with Sergei Severinov. to appear in the Journal of Economic Theory.
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Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency
Journal of Economic Theory July 2003, Volume 111, Issue 1, Pages 88-109.
- A correction for one of the conditions used to prove the
main theorem.
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Competing Pre-Marital Investments with
Aloysius Siow, revised March 2001. This is the extended working paper version of the paper that appeared in the Journal of Political Economy
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Common Agency and The Revelation Principle in postscript
or acrobat. Published in Econometrica 69 (5) pp 1349--1372 September 2001. Also a correction for an example that appeared in the paper.
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Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers and Costly
Search - April 98 Journal of Economic Theory at IDEAL 95(2) December 2000, or local version
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Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment Review of Economic Design 4 (1999)2 pp 273-292
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Surplus Extraction and Competition
Review of Economic Studies, July 2001, vol 68, issue 3
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A revelation Principle for Competing
Mechanisms (with Larry Epstein) Journal of Economic Theory 88(1) September 1999 pp 119-161
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