Research

Mingli Zheng has created an applet that lets you follow the bidding that occurred on auctions for Pentium processors during June and July of 2001 on eBay. The applet shows many auctions at once, so you can observe not only what people bid, but also where they bid. This is the focus of the working paper Internet Auctions with Many Traders linked below. You can read a description of the applet then follow the links contained there. Alternatively, you can just explore the data using this php applet.

Research

• The Mapinator Classification of Economics Departments with James Yu

• Rational Ignorance in Mechanism Design: Equal Priority Auctions with Li Hao

• Can Econjobmarket help Canadian Departments with Michel Poitevin and Kim Nguyen

• Unobserved Mechanisms(Revised Aug/23) with Li Hao.

• Understanding Transitions Using DIrected Search with Kun Li and Pai Xu

• Can Mechanism Designers Exploit Buyers Market Information May 2015

• Survey on Competing Mechnisms 2 - The revelation principle Canadian Journal of Economics 47(2), May 2014, pages 373-397.

• Matching by Luck or Search: Evidence from the Executive Labor Market with Pai Xu and Kun Li Jan 2014)

• Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design with Gorkem Celik to appear in the Canadian Journal of Economics, 2015

• A Brief Survey of ideas in the Competing Mechanisms literature written for the Handbook of Market Design. Last Revised: 2010-08-24 14:18:45 -0700 (Tue, 24 Aug 2010)(Revision: 2)

• Reciprocal Contracting Last Revised: 2015-03-09 15:20:07 -0700 (Mon, 09 Mar 2015)(Revision: 201) to appear in the Journal of Economic Theory

• A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms - with Christian Troncoso Valverde, Journal of Economic Theory 148(3) pp 953-973, 2013

• Definable and Contractible Contracts - with Balazs Szentes, Econometrica 80(1) pp 363--411, 2012

• Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism - with Gorkem Celik, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf)

• Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium :A Bayesian Approach

• Other Regarding Preference: Outcomes, Intentions or Interdependence, with Yoram Halevy
  , previously titled The Ultimatum Game; Interdependent Preferences in an Experimental Setting

• Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium

• Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search

• Non-Cooperative Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium July 2004

• The Pre-Marital Investment Game February 2004, Revised December 2005

• Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum an existence proof for the general version of the game.

• Internet Trading Mechanisms and Rational Expectations June 2003 - revised Jan 06 - with Sergei Severinov. The new title of the paper is An Ascending Double Auction.

• Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents to appear in Economic Theory.

• Internet Auctions with Many Traders with Sergei Severinov. to appear in the Journal of Economic Theory.

• Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency Journal of Economic Theory July 2003, Volume 111, Issue 1, Pages 88-109.

• A correction for one of the conditions used to prove the main theorem.

• Competing Pre-Marital Investments with Aloysius Siow, revised March 2001. This is the extended working paper version of the paper that appeared in the Journal of Political Economy

• Common Agency and The Revelation Principle in postscript or acrobat. Published in Econometrica 69 (5) pp 1349--1372 September 2001. Also a correction for an example that appeared in the paper.