Michael Peters Department of Economics University of British Columbia 997-1873 East Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Z1 Phone: 604-822-4418 peters at econ dot ubc dot ca Fax: 604-822-5915

• A reading on the simple economics of music downloading written for my honors micro class.
• Mingli Zheng has created an applet that lets you follow the bidding that occurred on auctions for Pentium processors during June and July of 2001 on eBay. The applet shows many auctions at once, so you can observe not only what people bid, but also where they bid. This is the focus of the working paper Internet Auctions with Many Traders linked below. You can read a description of the applet, use the php version of the applet, or use the java version of the applet which is much faster.

Research

• Matching by Luck or Search: Evidence from the Executive Labor Market with Pai Xu and Kun Li
• Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design with Gorkem Celik Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/reciprocal_mechanisms/reciprocal_mechanisms.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/reciprocal_mechanisms/reciprocal_mechanisms.pdf)
• A Brief Survey of ideas in the Competing Mechanisms literature written for the Handbook of Market Design. Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/competing/competing.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/competing/competing.pdf)
• A Revlelation Principle for Competing MechanismsLast Revised /web/htdocs/mike/dual_mechanisms/dual_mechanisms.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/dual_mechanisms/dual_mechanisms.pdf) The new tile of the paper is Reciprocal Contracting
• A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms - with Christian Troncoso Valverde, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/multiple_agency/multiple_agency.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/multiple_agency/multiple_agency.pdf)
• Definable and Contractible Contracts - with Balazs Szentes, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/folk_theorem/folk_theorem.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/folk_theorem/folk_theorem.pdf)
• Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism - with Gorkem Celik, Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/equilibrium_rejection/equilibrium_rejection.pdf)
• Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium :A Bayesian Approach Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/foundations_hedonic_2/foundations_hedonic_2.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/foundations_hedonic_2/foundations_hedonic_2.pdf)
• Other Regarding Preference: Outcomes, Intentions or Interdependence, with Yoram Halevy
  , previously titled The Ultimatum Game; Interdependent Prefrences in an Experimental Setting
• Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium Last Revised /web/htdocs/mike/truncated_hedonic/truncated_hedonic.pdf apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/mike/truncated_hedonic/truncated_hedonic.pdf)
• Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search Last Revised /web/htdocs/michael_peters/mixed_equilibrium/working_paper apparently not under version control(Revision /web/htdocs/michael_peters/mixed_equilibrium/working_paper)
• Non-Cooperative Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium July 2004
• The Pre-Marital Investment Game February 2004, Revised December 2005
  • Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum an existence proof for the general version of the game.
• Internet Trading Mechanisms and Rational Expectations June 2003 - revised Jan 06 - with Sergei Severinov. The new title of the paper is An Ascending Double Auction.
• Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents to appear in Economic Theory.
• Internet Auctions with Many Traders with Sergei Severinov. to appear in the Journal of Economic Theory.
• Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency Journal of Economic Theory July 2003, Volume 111, Issue 1, Pages 88-109.
  • A correction for one of the conditions used to prove the main theorem.
• Competing Pre-Marital Investments with Aloysius Siow, revised March 2001. This is the extended working paper version of the paper that appeared in the Journal of Political Economy
• Common Agency and The Revelation Principle in postscript or acrobat. Published in Econometrica 69 (5) pp 1349--1372 September 2001. Also a correction for an example that appeared in the paper.
• Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers and Costly Search - April 98 Journal of Economic Theory at IDEAL 95(2) December 2000, or local version
• Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment Review of Economic Design 4 (1999)2 pp 273-292
• Surplus Extraction and Competition Review of Economic Studies, July 2001, vol 68, issue 3
• A revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms (with Larry Epstein) Journal of Economic Theory 88(1) September 1999 pp 119-161