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Michael Peters Department of Economics
University of British Columbia
997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Z1
Phone: 604-822-4418
peters at econ dot ubc dot ca
Fax: 604-822-5915
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Research
- A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms - with Christian Troncoso Valverde, Last Revised: 2009-04-15 15:16:12 -0700 (Wed, 15 Apr 2009)(Revision: 34)
- Definable and Contractible Contracts - with Balazs Szentes, Last Revised: 2009-01-22 12:14:54 -0800 (Thu, 22 Jan 2009)(Revision: 176)
- Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism - with Gorkem Celik, Last Revised: 2008-10-20 12:08:12 -0700 (Mon, 20 Oct 2008)(Revision: 9)
- Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium :A Bayesian Approach Last Revised: 2007-12-10 11:52:51 -0800 (Mon, 10 Dec 2007)(Revision: 50)
- Other Regarding Preference: Outcomes, Intentions or Interdependence, with Yoram Halevy
Last Revised: 2009-06-23 17:31:01 -0700 (Tue, 23 Jun 2009)(Revision: 237), previously titled The Ultimatum Game; Interdependent Prefrences in an Experimental Setting
- Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium Last Revised: 2009-03-03 15:24:34 -0800 (Tue, 03 Mar 2009)(Revision: 83)
- Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search Last Revised: 2010-01-26 17:02:29 -0800 (Tue, 26 Jan 2010)(Revision: 139)
- Non-Cooperative Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium July 2004
- The Pre-Marital Investment Game February 2004, Revised December 2005
- Internet Trading Mechanisms and Rational Expectations June 2003 - revised Jan 06 - with Sergei Severinov. The new title of the paper is An Ascending Double Auction.
- Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents to appear in Economic Theory.
- Internet Auctions with Many Traders
with Sergei Severinov. to appear in the Journal of Economic Theory.
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Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency
Journal of Economic Theory July 2003, Volume 111, Issue 1, Pages 88-109.
- A correction for one of the conditions used to prove the
main theorem.
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Competing Pre-Marital Investments with
Aloysius Siow, revised March 2001. This is the extended working paper version of the paper that appeared in the Journal of Political Economy
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Common Agency and The Revelation Principle in postscript
or acrobat. Published in Econometrica 69 (5) pp 1349--1372 September 2001. Also a correction for an example that appeared in the paper.
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Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers and Costly
Search - April 98 Journal of Economic Theory at IDEAL 95(2) December 2000, or local version
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Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment Review of Economic Design 4 (1999)2 pp 273-292
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Surplus Extraction and Competition
Review of Economic Studies, July 2001, vol 68, issue 3
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A revelation Principle for Competing
Mechanisms (with Larry Epstein) Journal of Economic Theory 88(1) September 1999 pp 119-161
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